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Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine
of Rescue
Gerald L. Gordon*
. a certain man... fell among thieves, which stripped him
of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him
half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest
that way: And when he saw him, he passed by on the other
side. And likewise a Levite . . . came and looked on him,
and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan
* . . came where he was... and went to him, and bound up
his wounds... and set him on his own beast and brought him
to an inn ... Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spend-
est more, when I come again, I will repay thee...
St. Luke 10: 30-351
T HE AGE-OLD DICHOTOMY between Anglo-American law and
morality in one vital area of personal responsibility-the
duty to aid one in dire peril-was revealingly demonstrated anew
in the aftermath of the sordid Bronx events of March 13, 1964.
At 3:25 A. M., in the fashionable Kew Gardens neighborhood,
28-year-old Catherine Genovese, while returning home from
work, was accosted and stabbed. Her screams drove her assail-
ant away but he returned minutes later and stabbed her again.
Again she screamed for help and again he fled, only to return
a second time to renew his attack. Repeatedly she called upon
neighbors for help but although 38 acknowledged hearing her
cries, none came to her aid and she died. 2
The incident stunned the nation and provoked a spate of
commentaries in the popular media,8 including at least one deal-
ing with legal questions related to rescue.4 While the 38 wit-
* B.A., University of Florida; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 As similarly quoted in Evans, Good Samaritan in Search and Rescue,
17 JAG 107 (1963).
2 For the initial news report see The New York Herald Tribune, p. 10,
March 14, 1964. Magistrate Bernard J. Dubin is quoted as saying: "I wonder
how many lives could be saved in this city if people who ask for help were
not ignored."
3 Wainwright, The Dying Girl That No One Helped, Life, p. 21, April 10,
1964; Milgran and Hollander, The Murder They Heard, The Nation, p. 602,
June 15, 1964; Gross, Who Cares, Look, p. 17, Sept. 8, 1964; Time, p. 21,
June 26, 1964.
4 Nizer, When Silence Is A Crime, McCalls, p. 95, October, 1964.
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nesses were subject to that moral opprobrium of which the law
so frequently speaks,5 no one suggested that they bore any
civil or criminal liability. Our legal code prescribes no general
duty, other than moral, to come to the aid of another human
being who is in danger,6 even though the outcome is to cost him
his life and even though no greater act is required of the puta-
tive rescuer, as in the Genovese situation, than phoning the
police. This principle of law is so deeply established and solidly
entrenched that there are no known reported cases directly con-
troverting it.
Where an injured party has attempted to impose more than
a moral responsibility on a would-be rescuer, the results were
predictable. In one of the classic cases7 an 8-year-old boy, a
known trespasser, caught his arm in stationary machinery in a
manufacturing plant. The question was whether the defendant
company owed a duty to evict the boy promptly upon discovering
him. The court found no such duty. To underscore its decision,
the court conjured up an extreme hypothetical case where a
landowner knowingly but silently watches a child climb into a
garden and land on spikes. There would be no legal duty to give
warning in such a case, declared the court, and no one had sug-
gested that there should be such a duty.
In another case," an employee of a laundry caught her hand
in a mangle and her hand and wrist were crushed. A mechanic
was on the scene and allowed her to remain so trapped for
half an hour, in intense suffering. The court declared that no
cause of action arose from the failure to perform an act of hu-
manity since such failure involved no breach of duty imposed by
law.
One case held that a physician was not under a duty to
administer to his patient.9 The physician gave no reason for
refusing to respond to a call, there were no other doctors avail-
able and the patient died, but no liability attached to the doctor.
Some of the cases shock the judicial conscience but the same
5 United States v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Cas. 800, No. 15, 540 (N. D. Cal. 1864);
Kenney v. Hannibal and St. Joe R. R. Co., 70 Mo. 252 (1879); Buch v.
Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1897).
6 Prosser, Torts, 336 (3rd ed., 1964).
7 Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., supra, n. 5.
s Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S. E. 810 (1900).
9 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N. E. 1058 (1901).
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result obtains, nevertheless. In one such case,10 a railroad
worker, while removing ice and snow from the track, became
exhausted. He informed his employer and asked for food, shelter
and assistance in getting home. When this was refused, he
crawled home on his hands and knees. His feet were so frozen
that they had to be amputated. There was no liability for the
railroad company.
In another well known case," the decedent, a trespasser, had
his arm and leg cut off by the car wheel of defendant's freight
car. Defendant's employees failed to call a surgeon or to render
him any assistance but permitted him to remain by the side of
the tracks and bleed to death. In rejecting any legal duty owed
by the railroad,12 the court remarked, "With the humane side
of the question, courts are not concerned." 13
A criminal case involved a defendant who failed to aid his
deathly ill paramour after a week-end orgy during which she
consumed a large quantity of morphine. 14 His conviction for
manslaughter was set aside when the court held that his omis-
sion to act did not make him legally responsible for the de-
cedent's death.
Two especially shocking cases involved drownings. In one
situation, the defendant let boats for hire. 15 Plaintiff's decedent
rented a boat and it overturned. The drowning victim cried out
for help for 30 minutes but the defendant, who heard the yells,
ignored him. Judgment was for the defendant-there was no
duty to aid.
In a more recent case, Yania v. Bian,16 the drowning victim
was a business invitee on defendant's land. It was alleged that
the defendant had enticed him to jump into water that was eight
to ten feet deep and that after he had jumped, the defendant
failed to help extricate him. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that no cause of action had been shown since the defend-
10 King v. Interstate Consol. St. R. Co., 23 R. I. 583, 51 A. 301 (1902).
11 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903). The case is
discussed in 69 L. R. A. 533.
12 See 3 Elliot on Railroads, #1265 i: (2d ed., 1907). "The railroad company
is under no legal obligation to take charge of the wounded man, however
strong a moral obligation may be."
13 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281, 282 (1903).
14 People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N. W. 1128 (1907).
15 Osterland v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N. E. 301 (1928).
16 397 Pa. 316, 155 A. 2d 343 (1959).
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ant was not charged with pushing his guest into the water and
since the defendant had no legal, but only a moral, obligation
and duty to prevent the drowning.1
7
These cases have two features in common: (1) The conduct
of the defendants is violative of elemental community moral
standards, a fact which the courts duly note; (2) The defendants,
having violated no legal duty to act, are absolved of legal li-
ability.
The genesis of the doctrine that one owes no duty to aid
another in distress runs deep in the common law. Historically
it has been explained as representing a distinction between mis-
feasance, where the defendant has created a new risk of harm
for the plaintiff, and nonfeasance, where the defendant has not
aggravated the situation. s It has also been urged that since
the early common law was substantially occupied with overt
acts of misconduct there was a natural neglect of cases involving
an omission to act.19
Through the decades certain modifications and exceptions of
a judicial and statutory nature have circumscribed the basic
doctrine. The most important of these lies in the area of em-
ployer-employee relationships with the enactment of the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Act and state Workman Compensation
Laws, complemented by non-statutory duties imposed on em-
ployers. 20 Where there is a marital relationship, a duty to aid
one's spouse has been found.21 Laws requiring parents to care
for and protect their children have been enacted,2 2 giving legis-
lative form to a pre-existing common law duty.2 3 Hit and run
17 The case is discussed in Seavey, I Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 Vand.
L. Rev. 699 (1960).
18 Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in The Law of Torts (pts.
1-3), 53 U. Pa. L. Rev. 209, 273, 337 (1905); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid
Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev., 217, 219 (1908);
Studies in The Law of Torts 33 (1926).
19 Prosser, Torts, 183 (2d ed., 1955).
20 Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 333 U. S. 821 (1948); Carey v.
Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180 N. W. 889 (1921); Szabo v. Pennsylvania R. R., 132
N. J. L. 331, 40 A. 2d 562 (1945); Harris v. Pennsylvania R. R., 50 F. 2d
866 (4th Cir. 1931). Salla v. Hellman, 7 F. 2d 953 (S. D. Cal. 1925); Re-
statement (Second), Agency, #512 (1958).
21 Territory v. Mant3n, 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888).
22 N. Y. Penal Law #482, 483; Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23
Geo. V, C. 12, #1.
23 Regina v. Conde, 10 Cox C. C. 547 (N. P. 1867); Regina v. Bubb & Hook,
4 Cox C. C. 455 (N. P. 1850); Rex v. Gibbons & Proctor, 13 Cr. App. R. 134
(Continued on next page)
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statutes require the driver of a car who has hit another-
whether through negligence or not-to come to the aid of the
injured party.24 Where contractual obligations exist, a duty to
protect and rescue has been found.2 5 Where the plaintiff is a
patron 26 or a passenger of the defendant 27 and is in a position of
peril, a duty to provide aid has been imposed. The existence of
affirmative duties a landowner owes in respect to invitees, li-
censees and trespassers has become established law.2 s Of course
where the defendant has negligently caused the plaintiff's pre-
dicament, there is a clear duty to aid so that the injury is not
aggravated.2
9
Thus where there relationships involving contract, con-
sensus, causation, commercial enterprise, employment or family,
can be found, doors have been opened for the imposition of an
affirmative duty to aid. Where defendants have been made
liable for their failure to act, the rule of law is that the duty
(Continued from preceding page)
(1918); People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903); Stehr v. State,
92 Neb. 755, 139 N. W. 676 (1913); Rex v. Russell, Vict. L. R. 59 (1933);
See Note on Recent Cases, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (1934).
24 E.g, Ala. Code (1941) tit. 36 #31; Deering's Calif. Vehicle Code (1948)
#482; Tex. Penal Code (1925) art. 1150; Va. Code Ann. (1950) tit. 46, #46-
189. For cases interpreting hit and run statutes, see State v. Ray, 229 N. C.
40, 47 S. E. 2d 494 (1948); Summers v. Dominguez, 29 Cal. App. 308, 84 P.
2d 237 (1938); Brunfield v. Wofford, 102 S. E. 2d 103 (W. Va. 1958); Brooks
v. E. J. Willig Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal. 2d 669, 255 P. 2d 802 (1953).
Annot. 80 A. L. R. 2d 305 and 69 L. R. A. 513-533, 534; Restatement, Torts,
2nd Vol., Section 322, comment d, p. 870; see also Boyer v. Gulf, Colorado
and Santa Fe Railway Company, 306 S. W. 2d 215, 80 A. L. R. 2d 287 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957) where a Texas court rejects the theory that where a party
by coming in contact with another, has been injured, such other party, upon
discovering the injured person in a helpless condition, owes him a duty to
render assistance, even though the injury was not due to any negligence
of the other party.
25 65 C. J. S., Negligence #3, p. 344; Waters v. Anthony, 252 Ala. 244, 40 So.
2d 316 (1949); Franklin v. May Department Stores, 25 F. Supp. 735 (E. D.
Miss. 1938); Landreth v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 74 F. Supp. 801 (W. D. Mo.
1947).
26 Larkin v. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 P. 686 (1905). $10,000 for fail-
ure to properly aid an injured store patron. Devlin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 882 (D. C., N. Y., 1965).
27 Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Bryd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906).
28 Prosser, Torts, 358-425 (3rd ed. 1964); Brandywine Hundred Realty Co.
v. Cotillo, 55 F. 2d 231 (3d Cir. 1931); Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own
Property as a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 Col. L. Rev. 383(1917); Restatement, Torts, # 332, 337, 339; McNiece and Thornton, Af-
firmative Duties In Tort, 58 Yale L. R. 1272 (1949); Parsons v. Drake, 347
Pa. 247, 32 A. 2d 27 (1943).
29 Prosser, Torts 338 (with cases cited) (3rd ed. 1964).
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neglected must have been a legal duty arising out of the rela-
tionship of the parties and not a mere moral obligation.30 But
where no special relationship exists between the parties, where
they are strangers-or even neighbors-the old common law rule
negating a legal duty to aid one in peril still prevails.3 1
Protection for the Rescuer
What protection does the law offer the rescuer who, moti-
vated by a humanitarian impulse, seeks to render aid to another
in distress or in imminent peril and thereby risks injury to him-
self? Under the rescue doctrine, the Samaritan is excluded from
the general rule of assumption of risk. Thus, the Samaritan who
is aware of a danger and fails to exercise ordinary care to avoid
injury is not guilty of contributory negligence and is not pre-
cluded recovery from the person whose negligence was respon-
sible for the peril.32 If the rescuer is injured or killed while
risking his life to save another, recovery from the original tort-
feasor will not be denied unless the rescuer has acted rashly or
recklessly.3 3
The justification for this doctrine rests upon the principle that
it is commendable and meritorious to save life and that moral
and humanitarian considerations require a greater latitude of
conduct for the rescuer.34 The law has so high a regard for
human life, say the courts,3  that it will not impute negligence
in an effort to preserve it unless made under such circumstances
as to constitute rashness.
The rescue doctrine attempts to fuse certain fundamental
moral values with the law. But in doing so it lays bare the
30 Bishop's Crim. Law Vol. 1, #217, Vol. 2 #695 (6th ed.); 21 Am. & E. Enc.
Law 99 (2d ed.); State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 A. 249 (1897); Wharton's
Crim. Law 1011 (7th ed.); Clark & M., Crimes 931 (6th ed. 1958).
31 But see Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N. W. 1 (1907) where a
court found a host liable for failure to aid an ill invitee by expanding the
existing doctrine applicable to the relationship. The case is discussed in
120 A. L. R. 1529.
32 38 Am. Jur., Negligence # 228, p. 912 ff.
33 Annot. 19 A. L. R. 5; 65 C. J. S. Negligence #124, p. 738; Restatement,
Torts, Vol. 2, Negligence, #472, p. 1241 if; 38 Am. Jur. Negligence #228,
p. 912 ff.
34 38 Am. Jur. Negligence #228, p. 912 ff.
35 Great Northern R. Co. v. Harman, 217 F. 959 (CCA 9, 1914); Corbin v.
Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900); Jobst v. Butler Well Servicing,
190 Kan. 86, 372 P. 2d 55 (1962); Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502
(1871).
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fundamental contradiction which permeates the law as applied
to rescue situations. If humanitarian considerations are ger-
mane in sustaining the rescue doctrine in respect to the rights
of rescuers, then why are the same considerations irrelevant
in respect to the DUTY to rescue? 36 If the law has so high a
regard for human life as to exonerate a non-reckless but negli-
gent rescuer from contributory negligence, how justify the re-
fusal to impose a general duty upon one to aid another in peril,
at least in those situations where the would-be rescuer would
not be incurring any serious risk to himself?
The rescue doctrine does provide the rescuer with an en-
larged sphere within which he may attempt his rescue without
forfeiting his right to recover for injuries he may suffer. While
the cases on the subject are legion,3 7 one example at least is in-
dicative of the possible sweep of the doctrine's application. In
Brock v. Peabody Cooperative Equity Exchange,38 an 11-year-
old boy wandered into defendant's warehouse which had re-
cently been sprayed with deadly cyanide gas. When his mother
was informed, she rushed to the building, climbed an attached
ladder, fell inside and died from the gas fumes. In a wrongful
death action, the Kansas Supreme Court, in reversing, quoted
the following stirring words:
The instincts of a mother, when she sees her child in dis-
tress, will lead her to rush headlong to its rescue, without
stopping to count the cost or measure the risk which she is
incurring; and to say that an act to which her affection ir-
resistably impelled her should be charged against her as
something imprudent and unnecessary would be to shock
a sentiment which is as universal as mankind. The law is
not the creature of cold-blooded, merciless logic, and its in-
herent justice and humanity will never for a moment per-
mit the act of a mother in saving her offspring, no matter
how desperate it may have been, to be imputed to her as
negligence, or at any time or in any manner used to her
detriment.3 9
The Brock case stands at one pole of the rescue spectrum.
The decision in the case was obviously the expression of a court
30 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, supra, n. 13.
87 For a list of citations see 38 Am. Jur. p. 912, n. 3.
38 186 Kan. 657, 352 P. 2d 37 (1960).
39 Walters v. Denver Consolidated Electric Light Co., 12 Colo. App. 145, 54
P. 960, 962 (1898).
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profoundly moved by a mother's tragic plight. The rescue doc-
trine provided the necessary legal tool to defeat the attempt to
attribute contributory negligence to her conduct.
To conclude from this, however, that the rescuer is suitably
protected by the law would be unwarranted. For the fact is, as
will hereafter be shown, the path of the rescuer is strewn with
numerous obstacles and caveats, and neither the scope of the
existing rules nor their implementation can offer him any real
assurance should he require legal relief.
Caveat: Recklessness
An initial question concerns the rescuer's rashness and reck-
lessness. Under the rescue doctrine the rescuer may be acting
in an entirely selfless manner; he may be motivated by the
highest humanitarian considerations; he may be risking his life
to protect another whom he might not even know-yet, if he
crosses that legal boundary which separates rational and reason-
able conduct from reckless and rash conduct, he may be denied
recovery for his injuries.40 And a court may hold that any
antecedent negligence of the defendant has been effectively re-
moved as a critical factor from the case.
41
In French v. Trace,4 2 the rescuer, a truck driver, came upon
an overturned car with one of its riders pinned beneath. He
placed his shoulder under the hood of the car and, with the as-
sistance of three others, succeeded in raising the car and freeing
the man. The rescuer soon after developed a bursitis condition
in the shoulder and brought his action against the driver of the
overturned automobile. While there was some conflict in the
evidence, the truck driver testified that the trapped man was
bleeding, his leg badly scraped, and that he was screaming for
help. He further stated that the car's engine was smoking,
battery acid was leaking and there was the smell of gasoline.
The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the defense of
contributory negligence and verdict was for the plaintiff. The
Washington Supreme Court reversed, declaring the instruction
was erroneous and questioning whether "the extreme physical
exertion" employed by the rescuer was really necessary.
40 Supra, n. 33.
41 Infra, n. 42, 43 and 44.
42 48 Wash. 2d 235, 297 P. 2d 235 (1956).
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In Chattanooga Light and Power Co. v. Hodges,43 an en-
gineer made the ultimate sacrifice in attempting to give the
alarm when a fire broke out in his place of employment. He
was burned to death when he returned to the building in an ef-
fort to reach a phone. An action by his administrator resulted
in verdict and judgment for plaintiff. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee reversed, holding that his action, however heroic, was
one of extreme rashness.
In Elliot v. Pennsylvania Transport Co.,44 a fire broke out
and the plaintiff became apprehensive that there might be a
collision between an approaching trolley car and a fire truck.
Though without authorization to assume the function of a traf-
fic officer, he went out on the car track and signalled the trolley
car to stop so that the fire truck could pass. The trolley was
400 feet away, the motorman saw the plaintiff and there was
ample opportunity to stop in time had the motorman been so
disposed. However, he kept coming, and the trolley struck the
plaintiff. The jury and an appellate court found for the plaintiff,
but a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding
that plaintiff's reckless conduct in remaining on the tracks
barred his recovery.
In contrast to the Brock case, these three jury decisions for
the plaintiff-rescuer based on a recital of the facts were sub-
sequently reversed on the ground that there was, or might have
been, rash and reckless conduct which precluded recovery.
These cases illustrate the lack of explicit legal guide lines for the
rescuer. Conduct which to him or the jury seems necessary and
reasonable in an emergency may not be so regarded by a re-
viewing court.
Caveat: Timing
The cases suggest a further problem area for the rescuer. He
must properly time his rescue efforts. If he is a premature
rescuer and acts before the danger has fully materialized or if
he is a tardy rescuer and acts after the danger has passed, he
may find himself beyond the pale of the rescue doctrine.
The former was the situation in Cooper v. Teter.4 5 Follow-
ing an automobile accident, plaintiff's decedent came out on the
43 109 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W. 616 (1902).
44 356 Pa. 643, 53 A. 2d 81 (1947).
45 123 W. Va. 372, 15 S. E. 2d 152 (1941).
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highway waving his hands to give warning to approaching
drivers. He was struck down and killed. The court held that
the would-be rescuer was not exempt from the law of contribu-
tory negligence or the assumption of risk and that these de-
fenses could be interposed to defeat a wrongful death action.
The application of the rescue doctrine was denied on the basis
of a distinction between the act of giving a warning and the act
of attempting a rescue.46
Other cases illustrate the plight of the tardy rescuer. A
truck driver in Jobst v. Butler Well Servicing47 came upon an
overturned car at night. He pulled his truck over to the side
of the road, leaving the lights on but failing to set flares, and
went to give aid. He found one victim of the accident bleeding
profusely. While the truck driver was engrossed in rendering
assistance, the plaintiff's car plowed into the truck. The action
was against the truck driver. The court refused to permit the
application of the rescue doctrine by way of defense, holding that
there was no rescue here, that the initial accident had already
occurred and the truck driver was "merely" engaged in rendering
aid and assistance to persons already injured.4 8
If, then, the intervening party acts before an accident in an
effort to avert it, he is held not to be rescuing but merely giving
warning; if he acts after the accident in an effort to save the
victim, he is held not to be rescuing but merely rendering aid
and assistance. In neither case is he afforded the protection of
the rescue doctrine.
Caveat: Knowledge
Another tightrope the rescuer may be compelled to walk
relates to his knowledge of the circumstances involved in the
rescue. Paradoxical though it may seem, he may find his legal
cause frustrated if he knows too little-or too much.
In Hawkins v. Palmer,49 the rescuer, while driving his auto-
46 For cases involving volunteers standing in the road to warn motorists of
approaching peril, see Annot., 53 A. L. R. 2d 1003.
47 190 Kan. 86, 372 P. 2d 55 (1962).
48 The facts in the case suggest an interesting question: If the negligence
of the rescuer were held excusable under the rescue doctrine, could that
negligence, nonetheless, be imputable to the wrongdoer responsible for the
initial car accident? For cases holding that the rescue of a rescuer is fore-
seeable, see Richards v. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 126 Kan. 521, 268 P. 847
(1928); Brown v. Ross, 345 Mich. 54, 75 N. W. 2d 68 (1956).
49 29 Wash. 2d 570, 188 P. 2d 121 (1947).
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mobile, discovered a man and his wife lying injured from a
motorcycle crash. He drove to a nearby city and requested
police to send an ambulance. He returned to the scene of the
accident and was assisting the ambulance attendants in placing
the injured motorcyclists on stretchers when he was hit by an
automobile which sideswiped the ambulance. His action against
the defendant, the owner of the ambulance allegedly negligently
parked, was dismissed. The court held that the plaintiff's knowl-
edge of the dangerous condition of the highway created by the
ambulance driver's alleged negligence equalled that of the
ambulance driver. Since he knew or should have known of
the danger, the rescuer had voluntarily assumed the risk.
While the case involved other issues-the timing of the
ambulance driver's negligence in relation to the rescue and the
question of the proximate cause of the initial accident-the
court's emphasis on the rescuer's knowledge indicates, all as-
surances to the contrary notwithstanding, that a rescuer may be
held to assume the risk even when his conduct is not deemed to
be rash or reckless.
Caveat: Imminence of Danger
The rescuer's lack of knowledge, while it may prove dis-
astrous in a personal sense, may also prove fatal in a legal
sense. In order to justify his risking his life or incurring serious
injury in rescuing another person from danger, the danger
threatened to the latter must be imminent and real and not
merely imaginary or speculative. 50 If the rescuer predicates his
action on what appears in his judgment to be a perilous, emer-
gency situation, he may, nonetheless, find himself without legal
recourse if his judgment proves fallible.
Such was the situation in Wilson v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co.5 1 A railroad brakeman became concerned about the safety
of children who were holding onto and running alongside a
freight train. His shouts failed to drive them away and he de-
scended a ladder and waved his hands at them. In so doing he
was pushed from the train by a fence post near the track and
50 38 Am. Jur., Negligence #228, p. 913; Devine v. Pflaelzer, 277 Ill. 255,
155 N. E. 126 (1917); Tyler v. Barrick, 178 Iowa 985, 160 N. W. 273 (1916);
Eversole v. Wabash, 249 Mo. 523, 155 S. W. 419 (1913); Wright v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 110 Va. 670, 66 S. E. 848 (1910); 65 C. J. S., Negligence
#124, p. 738; Annot. 19 A. L. R. 11.
51 29 R. I. 146, 69 A. 364 (1908).
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was killed. The jury in a wrongful death action found the de-
fendant negligent in maintaining the fence post and verdict was
for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed,
holding there was no such imminent danger to the children as
to justify the brakeman's action. The court considered his esti-
mate of the danger so far removed from the actuality as to pre-
vent recovery.
Caveat: Foreseeability
Can a rescuer be denied recovery if his rescue effort was
not foreseeable by the original tortfeasor? The vast majority of
American courts will not bar the rescuer on this basis, holding,
with Cardozo, 52 that even if the wrongdoer may not have antic-
ipated a rescue attempt, he is accountable as if he had. Never-
theless, it cannot be said that the issue of foreseeability is en-
tirely and everywhere excluded.
In the controversial Saylor v. Parson5:3 case, the rescuer was
a workman who jumped from a position of safety to prevent a
brick wall from falling on his employer. The court, in rejecting
the workman's claim for damages for injuries suffered, ruled
that no negligence by the employer had been shown. In dis-
cussing the question of foreseeability, the court noted that since
rescue efforts are relatively rare, they should not be considered
anticipatory.54 The Saylor case remains good law in some juris-
dictions and was a principal authority for one 1964 decision.55
Even when the rescuer has prevailed, the question of fore-
seeability may be prominent in the court's thinking. In Tal-
bert v. Talbert,56 a man, injured while frustrating his father's
suicide attempt, was permitted to bring an action. However the
court greatly emphasized that since the father knew that the
son was in the immediate vicinity, the rescue effort was fore-
seeable. Professor Bohlen's rule on the subject of rescue and
52 "Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.
The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to
its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects with-
in the range of the natural and probable. . . . The risk of rescue, if only
it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man.
The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is
accountable as if he had." Cardozo, C.J., in Wagner v. International R. C.,
232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 423 (1921).
53 122 Iowa 679, 98 N. W. 500 (1904).
54 Id. at p. 502.
55 Betz v. Glaser, 375 S. W. 2d 611 (Mo. App. 1964).
56 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199 N. Y. S. 2d 212 (1960).
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suicide also emphasizes foreseeability as a prerequisite for an
injured rescuer's recovery.57
Caveat: The Rescuer's Negligence
If the rescuer's negligence has been the proximate cause of
the perilous situation, recovery for the rescuer's injuries is ex-
cluded.58 This rule, where properly applied, can hardly evoke
objection; where improperly applied, it may provide another
formula for defeating an injured rescuer's legitimate efforts to
obtain relief.
In DeMahy v. Morgan Louisiana & T. Railroad & Steam-
ship Co.,59 a two-year-old girl was thrown from a train as the
result of a sudden jolt. The mother, a passenger, jumped from
the train, reached her arm under the car and saved the child. In
the process, the mother's arm was badly crushed. A verdict
against the railroad company was reversed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The court said that it was not called upon to
decide the question of the defendant's negligence since the
mother's negligence in not watching the child was the proxi-
mate cause of her injury. The court's reasoning is strained. It
seems to be holding that once the child wandered away, what-
ever harm might subsequently befall her was necessarily the
mother's responsibility. The fact that the child might not have
been thrown from the train-thus obviating the mother's rescue
-if the railroad had properly performed its duty in protecting
its passengers was missed by the court.
Caveat: The Rescued As Defendant
May the party rescued be liable for the rescuer's injuries if
his negligence was the proximate cause of his plight? No such
suggestion is contained in the rescue doctrine but the question
has been under examination by the courts.
57 "The rescuer's right of action, therefore, must rest upon the view that
one imperils another, at a place where there may be bystanders, must take
into account the chance that some bystander will yield to the meritorious
impulse to save life or even property from destruction, and attempt a res-
cue ... a person . . . who attempts to take his life in a place where others
may be expected to be, does commit a wrongful act towards them in that it
exposes them to a recognizable risk of injury." (Emphasis added), Bohlen,
Studies in the Law of Torts, p. 569 (1926).
58 Restatement, Torts, #472, note p. 1242; 38 Am. Jur. Negligence #229, p.
914; 65 C. J. S. Negligence #124, p. 738.
59 45 La. Ann. 1329, 14 So. 61 (1893).
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In Betz v. Glaser,°0 the rescuer sustained serious injuries
when he fell from a ladder while engaged in cutting a limb from
a tree on defendant's property. As he would cut the branches,
the defendant, ignoring his warnings, would run under the tree,
pick them up and carry them away. As one branch was about
to fall, he saw her under the tree. He released his hold on the
ladder, grabbed the branch and fell. A jury found for the plain-
tiff but a judgment n.o.v. for defendant was sustained. The
court's theory of the rescue doctrine was that it could be applied
only when there was actionable negligence by a third party.
Missouri courts do not permit the rescuer to recover from the
party rescued.
There are cases to the contrary. Injured rescuers have been
permitted to recover from motorists who were freed from
beneath cars. 1' A guest who helped save his host from fire and
then sued him for injuries suffered was held to have stated a
cause of action.6 2 But the cases are too few to reach definitive
conclusions and to erase this further element of uncertainty
which confronts the rescuer.
Caveat: No Negligence
In the absence of proven negligence, the rescuer has no re-
course for his injuries.63 On this basic rule, there is unanimity.
The injured rescuer, while his act may represent the highest of
heroics, may, nevertheless, never be indemnified, even though
he may have avoided every legal pitfall in respect to his own
conduct. To determine his rights, the injured rescuer will have
to investigate. Since his cause of action is strictly derivative, he
will have to probe into the background of the event to ascer-
tain who or what brought it about. He will have to prove that
the third party was negligent toward the rescued party in order
to establish a sufficient case in his own behalf.
By way of illustration, the rescuer in Neal v. Home Build-
ers,6 4 was a mother, who went to her death when she rushed to
save her child, who was trapped on a stepladder in a semi-coin-
60 375 S. W. 2d 611 (Mo. App. 1964).
61 Britt v. Mangum, 261 N. C. 250, 134 S. E. 2d 235 (1964); Brugh v. Bigelow,
310 Mich. 74, 16 N. W. 2d 668 (1944).
62 Clayton v. Blair, 117 N. W. 2d 879 (Iowa 1962).
63 Supra, n. 58.
64 232 Ind. 160, 111 N. E. 2d 280, 111 N. E. 2d 713 (1953).
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pleted building. In an action for wrongful death, the plaintiff
tried to show that the defendant-builder was maintaining an
attractive nuisance. A divided court rejected the plea. It held
there was no attractive nuisance and hence no violation of any
legal duty owed the child. If there was no violation of a duty
owed the child, there could be no violation of a duty owed the
child's rescuer. The rescue doctrine was ruled inapposite and
the plaintiff's case failed.
Summary of the Problem
In summary then, if the rescuer has not acted in a rash or
reckless manner; if he has timed his rescue so that he is neither
too early nor too late; if he does not know too much so that he
has assumed the risk or too little so that his estimate of the risk
was faulty; if the danger threatened was imminent and real and
not imagined or speculative; if his rescue was foreseeable either
in law or in fact; if his action did not proximately cause the
perilous situation; if the defendant was not the person he res-
cued, or if he is in a jurisdiction where this is not a bar; if there
is a tortfeasor whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
peril-then the rescuer may have legal recourse in the event of
injury. Such is the rescuer's legal situation.
As a practical matter, the rescuer in the moment of crisis
is probably oblivious to what he would otherwise regard as
esoteric legal formulae.65 He perceives a person in peril and-
because he is part of a special breed of humanity-he intervenes
to help. Often he does so at a tremendous personal sacrifice. It
is only in the aftermath of the rescue where the rescuer has
been injured or where he otherwise finds himself a party to a
legal action that problems may arise. If he seeks compensation
for an injury, he may find that his conduct, however heroic and
well-intentioned, has violated one or another legal norm. Or,
conceivably, he will discover that while his conduct was im-
peccable, he may still not recover since he cannot prove action-
able negligence by another. Thus he may be left solely to the
magnanimity of the person he saved.
65 ,,... when one sees his fellow man in such peril, he is not required to
pause and calculate as to court decisions, nor recall the last statute as to
the burden of proof, but he is allowed to follow the promptings of a gen-
erous nature and extend help which the occasion requires." Norris v. At-
lantic Coast Line R. R., 152 N. C. 505, 67 S. E. 1017, 1021 (1910).
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The Good Samaritan Laws
Since the preservation and protection of human life is or
should be a major social objective, it ineluctably follows that
those who voluntarily and altrustically act to implement this ob-
jective deserve a better fate than they frequently receive.
During the past five years, laws have been enacted in 28 states 0
designed to improve the legal position of the rescuer. Commonly
known as the Good Samaritan Statutes, these laws liberalize the
standard of care required of the rescuer and protect him from
law suits brought by persons aided. 7 By allaying the fear of
liability for those administering help, it is theorized that the
Good Samaritan laws will furnish additional incentives for the
putative rescuer to act.
Yet the limitations of the Good Samaritan laws are patent.
They reach only gratuitous rescuers, eschewing altogether the
imposition of a general duty to aid another in peril. They do not
purport to deal with the problem of the rescuer's injuries. Fully
two-thirds of the laws protect doctors and nurses exclusively, 68
and they, rather than the ordinary rescuer or person in distress,
are the intended beneficiaries. Since there are no reported
cases dealing with a physician's malpractice in rendering emer-
gency care or treatment outside of his office or hospital, 9 the
laws represent basically a form of insurance for the medical pro-
fession. While much has been written on the subject,70 there is
no solid, convincing evidence that a dedicated physician will
avoid tendering to one in distress in the absence of a Good Sa-
maritan law, or that a physician who is not so dedicated will ex-
tend such aid as the result of the enactment of such legislation.
66 Alaska, Ark., Calif., Conn., Ga., Ind., Md., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mont.,
Neb., Nev., N. H., N. J., N. M., N. D., Ohio, Okla., Pa., R. I., S. D., Tenn.,
Tex., Utah, Va., Wis., Wyo.
67 Introductory Statement, N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A:62A-1, 2A:62A-2 (Supp.
1963).
68 Shannon, Good Samaritan Statutes-Adrenalin for the "Good Samaritan,"
13 De Paul L. Rev. 297, 299 (1964).
69 50 Calif. L. Rev. 816 (1963); Letter dated Aug. 26, 1963, from Hon. Otto
Kerner, Governor, State of Illinois, addressed to Secretary of State, vetoing
House Bill No. 1489 (proposed Illinois Good Samaritan bill, passed by
House and Senate).
70 Kearney, Why Doctors Are "Bad" Samaritans, Readers Digest, p. 87,
May, 1963; Medical Tribune, p. 23, Aug. 28, 1961; Notes, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
641 (1962); 51 Cal. L. Rev. 816 (1963); Howell, Statutes-Torts-Negligence
-- Good Samaritan Not Liable for Negligent Emergency Care Unless Will-
fully or Wantonly Negligent, 40 Tex. L. Rev. 909 (1962).
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Starting Point: The Duty to Aid
If relief for the rescuer is warranted and is to be found,
the search must proceed in a different direction. The logical
starting point leads directly to a re-examination of the whole
concept of duty as applied to rescue.
As indicated, from the earliest days of the common law, no
general duty has been imposed upon one individual to come to
the aid of another who is in danger.7 1 Despite the fact that this
doctrine has long been subject to sharp attack by the most dis-
tinguished legal authorities7 2-and all the exceptions to it not-
withstanding-it continues to reign supreme with a virtually un-
blemished tenacity. The legal ratiocinations sustaining it invite
analysis.
Where the subject has been specifically discussed,73 these
arguments have been advanced:
1. The circumstances giving rise to a duty of aid are diffi-
cult to delineate and recognize.
2. Of several witnesses to the peril of another-who would
be liable for the failure to give aid if possible?
3. The law should not attempt to enforce unselfishness.
4. It is a form of slavery to make one man serve another.
It runs counter to our Anglo-American individualistic
tradition.
The first of these objections involves the problem of delimiting
the rescue area. Concern is expressed, for example, for the
surgeon who is miles away and receives an emergency call.
Under what circumstance would the law require him to respond?
What distance is reasonable? One, two, or five miles?
In reply, it should be parenthetically noted that the law of
71 Supra, n. 6 through 16.
72 Bentham, Specimen of a Penal Code, in 1 Bentham's Works 164 (Bow-
ring's ed. 1843); An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion 322-23 (1823); Theory of Legislation (Hildreth's Transl. 1931); Liv-
ingston, Code of Crimes and Punishment in H Complete Works 126-27(1873); Bruce, Humanity and the Law, 73 Cent. L. J. 335 (1911); Bohlen,
Studies in the Law of Torts, 342 (1926); Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal
Science, 25-26; Pound, Law and Morals, 67-68 (2d ed. 1926); Prosser, Torts,
336-37 (3rd ed. 1964); Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97 (1908);
Warner, Duty of a Railroad to Care for a Person Rendered Helpless, 7 Cal.
L. Rev. 312 (1919).
73 Macauley's Speeches and Poems; Reports and Notes on the Indian Penal
Code pp. 404-408 (1837); Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty
of Care, 1 De Paul L. Rev. 35 (1951).
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torts is permeated with the problem of drawing lines.7 4 Were
every doctrine confronted with such a problem to be withdrawn,
our legal system would be in shambles. In the present instance,
the Italian law provides what is probably the most intelligible
boundary: presence.75 The rescuer must be in the vicinity and
must see or hear before liability attaches.
The second objection is usually illustrated by the following
hypothetical: If fifty men, all capable swimmers, see a child
drowning and none acts to save the child, which of the fifty shall
be liable? This presents no insuperable problem-all fifty would
be liable.
The third objection involves a choice of values. Selfishness
need not be clothed with a sacrosanct legal robe in the name of
preserving freedom. All law involves a weighing and balancing
of interests and if "enforcing unselfishness" means to affirm, for
example, this duty on the expert swimmer to rescue the drown-
ing child, who shall argue the swimmer's right to look the other
way?
The fourth objection is clearly the crux of the entire con-
troversy. It is the same objection that is invariably voiced in
opposition to proposals for progressive change in the socio-polit-
ical sphere. It is the voice of the past seeking to maintain the
present and making its claim on the future. Individualism in
the law as elsewhere is made a fetish and the right to ignore a
fellow human being's plight is considered inviolate.
The affirmation of a duty to aid one in peril is neither slavery
nor the negation of a healthy individualism. Rather it is the rec-
ognition that man is a social animal, that our modern society is
interdependent and that the days of unrestricted individualism
are behind us. The argument for the new doctrine is rooted in
the conviction that a truly civilized society cannot abide a situa-
tion where one man turns his back and lets another die when
by a safe and simple act he could have saved his life. Its ad-
vocacy is grounded on the axiom that the common law is not
static; that its traditions are constantly enriched and refur-
bished by the experience of life. As Dean Prosser has remarked,
in a very vague general way, the law of torts reflects current
74 See the classic case, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N. Y. 331,
162 N. E. 99 (1928).
75 Article 593 of the Penal Code.
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ideas of morality and when such ideas have changed, the law
has kept pace with them.7"
Legislation
A few countries have elevated the moral obligation to aid
another in distress into a legal responsibility. The Dutch Penal
Code provides:
One who, witnessing the danger of death with which another
is suddenly threatened, neglects to give or furnish him such
assistance as he can give or procure without reasonable fear
of danger to himself, is to be punished, if the death of the
person in distress follows, by a detention of three months at
most and an amende of three hundred florins at most.
77
France had a similar statute during the Vichy period. Upon
liberation, a broader law was enacted abrogating as a condition
of liability the requirement that the perilous situation actually
result in serious bodily injury or death.78 Under Soviet law, the
duty to aid one in peril is imposed in particular instances; the
provision attaching a general duty, 0 however, smacks some-
what of the contract concept.8 0 Italian law is primarily con-
cerned with abandoned or misplaced children under 10 years
of age or a person incapable of providing for himself because of
sickness of mind or body or old age. Failure to inform the au-
thorities promptly upon discovery of such individuals may lead
to imprisonment or fine."' The following rule has been sug-
gested for the United States:
One who fails to interfere to save another from impending
death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little
or no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great
bodily harm follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall
be punished criminally and shall make compensation to the
party injured or to his widow and children in case of death. 2
76 Prosser, Torts, 16 (3rd ed., 1964).
77 Article 450 of the Penal Code. This provision was enacted in 1881.
78 Article 63 of the Penal Code.
79 Article 156 of the Penal Code.
80 For a discussion of the French and Soviet laws, see Comp. Law-Note,
52 Col. L. Rev. 631 (1952).
81 Article 593 of the Penal Code. The Italian law is discussed in Nizer,
When Silence Is A Crime, supra, n. 4.
82 Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1908).
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These laws and proposals impose no insufferable burdens.
They are not designed to subject the rescuer to an unreasonable
risk but are restricted to situations where he may safely act
and avert serious injury or death to another. They are neither
impractical nor utopian-the Dutch law has been in operation
for more than 3/4 of a century. They intrude upon no known
fundamental right and they violate no known basic freedom.
They are necessary precisely because the alternative, the total
reliance on the volunteer rescuer, has proven so inadequate.
The Genovese incident, and others like it,83 offer ample con-
firmation.
A legislative enactment affirming a duty to aid another in
peril, while patently not a panacea, would at least place the
stamp of law on a duty which the courts uniformly recognize
as owing, albeit in the moral sphere. New guide lines would be
created in promoting a higher form of human conduct geared
to making America a community of genuine neighbors.
Aid to the Rescuer-Conclusion
Irrespective of the existence or non-existence of a legal duty
to assist another in a crisis situation, the law today does not
deal generously with the voluntary or gratuitous rescuer. Since
he frequently risks life and limb in an altrustic act, the standard
of conduct by which his actions are calibrated should differ
qualitatively and not quantitatively from standards imposed in
the non-rescue situation. That this is not the case is attested
by the remarks of one court which referred to the "so-called
rescue doctrine" as not affecting the ordinary standard of care
other than applying it to a situation where an attempt is being
made to save human life.8 4
While the argument for giving increased legal aid to the
rescuer would seem merited in any case, the case for it would
be ineffably strengthened if made within the context of an af-
firmative duty to aid. The reason for this is self-evident: So
83 See for example the Associated Press story of January 18, 1965, describ-
ing the drowning of a man in Norfolk, Virginia, while 30 to 40 persons
watched but refused to help. The one man who attempted a rescue is
quoted as saying: "I just keep thinking about those three little kids left
without a daddy. It busted me up. I can't see how those people could
stand and watch a man die without trying to help him." Cleveland Plain
Dealer, p. 5, January 18, 1965.
84 Henjun v. Bok, 261 Minn. 74, 110 N. W. 2d 461, 463 (1961).
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long as the rescuer is a gratuitous agent who has voluntarily
chosen to intervene when he is not required to do so, he runs
the risk of being tagged a meddler, 5 particularly if his well-in-
tentioned efforts eventuate in disaster. If on the other hand,
there exists a compulsion to act, then the rescuer has the right
to demand of the law a greater beneficence in its judgment of
his conduct. Where his act involves personal risk-though the
law does not require him to assume that risk-he may at least
argue that he has acted in the spirit of the law, transcending its
minimal imperatives to achieve its stated objective: the protec-
tion and preservation of human life.
How then may the rescuer be aided? First, by excusing acts
and omissions made in good faith and thus narrowing the per-
missive application of contributory negligence. The rescuer who
applies his sinew to lift a car and free the man trapped beneath,
is excused from the judgment that this act was extreme since it
was executed in good faith. So, too, is the rescuer, who de-
scends to his death while trying to wave off children, exoner-
ated for his alleged recklessness since he demonstrably acted
in good faith. The good faith criterion, so common to the Good
Samaritan statutes, should be incorporated into the rescue doc-
trine and given a general application.
Secondly, some of the legal barriers erected to prevent the
injured rescuer from obtaining recompense should be expunged
from the law. Where the rescued party is negligent, he should
be explicitly included as a proper defendant; questions involving
timing of the rescue and knowledge of the rescuer should be
resolved in the rescuer's favor so long as he has acted in good
faith. Rescue should be made unequivocally foreseeable as a
matter of law. The rescuer's responsibility for creating the
perilous situation should be measured against the defendant's
prior or subsequent negligence and where close questions in-
volving intervening cause arise they should be decided for the
rescuer.
Third, where the rescuer is injured in the scope of his res-
cue and where neither negligence nor magnanimity is present,
he should as a matter of right be entitled to the assistance of
public agencies. While the laudatory comments of the press may
be salutary, the more mundane need of the injured rescuer may
85 Note the tenor of the court's remarks in Elliot v. Pennsylvania Trans-
port Co., supra, n. 44.
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be competent medical attention with the expense socially ab-
sorbed.
Conclusion
When law and morality travel divergent roads, one of three
conclusions appears irresistible:
(1) either the moral principle, while susceptible to uni-
versal acceptance, lacks tangibility and definiteness, pre-
cluding its translation into law-no one yet has sug-
gested enacting the Golden Rule;
(2) or, a standard of conduct, while acceptable as a moral
guide, is objectionable as a law-a proposal to outlaw
prevarication would not be well received;
(3) or, the law, for historic or socio-political reasons, lags
behind the moral principle, awaiting a confluence of
pressures and events to create the necessary consensus
and unification. Here lies the rescue problem.
If change is to come, from which source may the first initia-
tive be anticipated? The likelihood is in the civil side of the law
and by way of judicial pronouncement. The common law in the
rescue area is not so ossified as to seal its frontiers to the bold-
ness of a pioneering court. The court in the Yania case8 6 had a
propitious opportunity to break new ground by imposing liability
for failure to rescue an invitee, but it declined to do so. Another
court may choose a different tack.
Wherever people live or work or play or travel, unpredict-
able events will trigger crises into the lives of unsuspecting
persons. The Levites on the scene will shake their heads, shrug,
and pass to the other side; the Samaritans will roll up their
sleeves and move quickly to the rescue; and the law, its doctrine
under challenge, will be standing in the wings, waiting for the
summons to find justice.
86 Supra, n. 16.
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